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THE TWENTY-EIGHTH GEORGE ELIOT MEMORIAL LECTURE, 1999
Delivered by Dr Josie Billington
'WHAT CAN I DO?' GEORGE ELIOT, HER READER AND THE TASKS
OF THE NARRATOR IN MIDDLEMARCH
Middlemarch is widely recognized as being one of the most strenuously narrated novels in
English literature. Many of the most moving, and most quoted, lines of the novel are the product of direct narrational intervention and the reader is aware of the surrounding, solicitous
presence of the author-narrator throughout the novel. Throughout this paper, I am going to be
looking closely at a number of short passages from the novel in order to try to establish the
'tasks' - as I call them - which George Eliot undertakes and fulfils through her narrator in
Middlemarch. But I should like to point out before going on the occasion of my interest in the
narrating voice in George Eliot's work since it bears on my argument. That interest came about
in the first place through my interest in the absence of such an explicit narrating presence in
the mature work of Elizabeth Gaskell - her Wives and Daughters in particular. In a study of
Gaskell which I have recently completed - which looks at Gaskell's work in relation to George
Eliot among other nineteenth-century realist writers - I conclude that the absence in Gaskell's
work of the strenuous narrative voice we find in George Eliot's work, can be explained in part
by the fact that Gaskell's depiction of real life in her novels rests upon religious faith. (Gaskell
was a lifelong and committed Unitarian.) That firm religious faith, I conclude, enabled Gaskell
to accept the complexity - including the sadness, the failures, the waste and the human hurts
- which she witnesses and registers in her final novel, as something which, however apparently without design, was divinely ordered and ordained. Gaskell, that's to say, did not feel the
need to worry through the complexity and the human perplexity she depicts - explicitly thinking, arguing or explaining her way out of the problem - in the way that George Eliot, by contrast, characteristically did feel the need to do, and I came to wonder, with renewed, revitalized interest, how far that need in George Eliot was the result of her loss of religious faith.
(This wasn't, of course, a new question, but I was arriving at it in a new way.) A pro-Gaskell
reader might say that Gaskell's belief in God meant that she didn't need to play God in her
novels in the way that George Eliot is often accused of doing - insistently offering (so critics
complain) the authoritative last word on everything. Part of my purpose here is to offer a more
sympathetic account of the ways in which the narrating voice in Middlemarch might be seen
as substituting for a lost divinity. But it is also part of my purpose to suggest that this substitutive function is not the whole story.
I shall begin by looking at some of the criticisms of George Eliot's narrative voice. Andrew
Davies, the writer of the 1994 BBC TV adaptation of the novel, has said:
One thing I've always hated about George Eliot is the way she'll write a brilliantly dramatic and moving scene and then spend the next few pages pointing
out all the subtleties, just in case we missed them.
One senses Davies's frustrations here as a screen-writer faced with the challenge of translating to a
television medium the wealth of direct authorial comment he finds in Middlemarch. But Davies is
reiterating a frequently-made complaint: that the authorial comment in the novel is, or ought to be,

13

superfluous, an added-extra. George Steiner, for instance, writing in the 'fifties, said:
By interfering constantly in the narration George Eliot attempts to persuade us
of what should be artistically evident. . .. It should be noted that omniscience is
an author's most lazy approach and that personal interference in the action
must be compared to what occurs in a Chinese theatre where the manager
comes on during the play to change props.
We shouldn't be able to see the author at work, is part of Steiner's complaint: the artist should
not be so visible but should disappear into the work of art itself. More recently, and from a
rather different critical perspective, Colin MacCabe has also accused George Eliot of being an
over-dominant presence within her novels. Her moralizing, didactic voice, he says, places the
author and her reader in an illegitimate position of superiority with regard to the stories and
characters she depicts. The author-narrator, George Eliot, and with her the reader, who is in
possession of the author's specialized wisdom, always knows more, and always knows better,
than the characters, who are explained definitely from the outside. The characters, that is to
say, are not themselves in possession of the truth about themselves. MacCabe's objections go
further than this really. What he and critics like him find unacceptable about the intrusive comments of the author-narrator in a novel like Middlemarch, is that these comments and judgements constitute an attempt, as these critics see it, to persuade the reader that there is a final,
single and knowable truth or reality to which the author has privileged access. Indeed these
criticisms extend beyond George Eliot to the tradition of the realist novel as a whole. The very
idea that there exists a single and knowable reality that the realist novel can reliably reproduce
or represent, is, such modern critics say, a trick, a con, an illusion which the realist novelists
of the nineteenth-century partly fell for and partly created. Twentieth-century novelists, such
as James Joyce, this argument goes, have resisted this trick by highlighting or foregrounding
the very difficulties they experience with representing reality. So these modernist novelists
tend to produce disjointed, fragmentary and unreaderly novels, with the result that we cannot
succumb to the cosy illusion that what we are witnessing as we read is 'real life' .
I mention the wider context of MacCabe's criticism since it indicates that in part the objections
that I have outlined to the narrative voice in Middlemarch are a matter of twentieth-century
aesthetic taste. The tradition of the 'omniscient or all-knowing author convention' and of the
'intrusive narrator' in which George Eliot is working, has fallen out of favour. In an age of
increasing scepticism, modern readers are reluctant to accept the sort of 'God-like' authority
assumed by the omniscient narrator. It is likely that most readers have felt ill at ease on occasion in the presence of the author-narrator's direct comments to (and often about) the reader.
But there are two specific objections here against which George Eliot's un embarrassedly
explicit presence in her novels requires some detailed defence. One is that the narrative voice
is, or ought to be, merely redundant - that the lives and characters depicted should be left to
speak for themselves. The other is that the author-narrator habitually places herself above her
characters, offering explanatory thoughts about them, which exist only externally from the
characters themselves. I shall try to deal with both of these criticisms in relation to the first
four passages I have selected from Middlemarch, though it will be my object to try to refute
these charges throughout the lecture. But I want, in addition, to offer a reading of these pas-
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sages which argues not only that one cannot wish away the role of the narrative voice, without wishing away George Eliot's entire project in Middlemarch, but that we have much to lose,
even personally, as readers by rejecting what is made available through the operation of
George Eliot's narrative voice.
I want to begin by looking at a passage from quite late in the novel, in which Lydgate, the idealistic young doctor who has married the attractive but immovably self-interested Rosamond,
has been begging his wife to help him to make domestic economies so that they shouldn't go
broke. He has patiently explained to her how difficult their financial situation has become and
waits for her reply. This is it:
' What can I do Tertius?' said Rosamond, turning her eyes on him again. That
little speech of four words, like so many others in all languages, is capable by
varied inflexions of expressing all states of mind from helpless dimness to
exhaustive argumentative perception, from the completest self-devoting fellowship to the most neutral aloofness. Rosamond's thin utterance threw into
the words: 'What can I do! ' as much neutrality as they could hold. They fell
like a mortal chill on Lydgate's roused tenderness. He did not storm in indignation - he felt too sad a sinking of the heart. And when he spoke again it was
more in the tone of a man who forces himself to fulfil a task. (Middlemarch,
Chapter 58)
No one could be more superficial than Rosamond, we are made to feel here. She makes those
four words - words which could have been so meaningful as we shall see later - as superficial
as she possibly can. But around and beneath those four words, the narrator supplies over seventy words which spell out their plenitude of implication. The narrator's presence here, that is
to say, gives a sense of depth and meaning even to Rosamond's lack of deep meaning, by
showing us what that lack of meaning itself means to Lydgate - how much he feels her lack
of feeling, that is. 'They fell like a mortal chill on Lydgate's roused tenderness.'
The narrative voice, I am saying, is not simply an add-on extra here, pointing out subtleties
which would be obvious to any careful reader. On the contrary, George Eliot is using her narrative voice to disclose the unspoken and unseen, the hidden content, the bigger thing behind
it all which gives meaning to what.is going on at the surface of life, yet which cannot easily
by gleaned from attention to the surface of life alone. One of the functions of the narrative
voice in such passages, then, is to supply the background of understanding - the sub-text, the
psychology and, where necessary, the mitigation, or excuse, which lies beneath the surface of
action, speech and character. And it is that mitigation which we see in the following passage
which comes from much earlier in the novel. Up to this point we have learned what virtually
everybody else among the Middlemarch gentry, including Dorothea herself of course, thinks
about the coming union of Mr Casaubon, the older man and scholarly bachelor, whose life's
intellectual labour has been spent in a futile search for the 'Key to All Mythologies', and the
youthful, ardent, idealistic Dorothea. The judgements of the marriage have generally not been
favourable to Mr Casaubon, who has been described variously as 'no better than a mummy'
by Sir James Chettam, Dorothea's thwarted suitor, and as 'a great bladder for dried peas to rattle in' by Mrs Cadwallader. So after nine chapters or so of people's estimates of the man, we
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are given, in Chapter 10, the first extended view of Mr Casaubon's own thoughts and feelings
as his marriage to Dorothea approaches:
In truth, as the day fixed for his marriage came nearer, Mr Casaubon did not
find his spirits rising; nor did the contemplation of that matrimonial gardenscene, where, as all experience showed, the path was to be bordered with flowers, prove persistently more enchanting to him than the accustomed vaults
where he walked taper in hand. He did not confess to himself, still less could
he have breathed to another, his surprise that though he had won a lovely and
noble-hearted girl he had not won delight - which he had also regarded as an
object to be found by search ....
Poor Mr Casaubon had imagined that his long studious bachelorhood had
stored up for him a compound interest of enjoyment, and that large drafts on
his affections would not fail to be honoured .... And now he was in danger of
being saddened by the very conviction that his circumstances were unusually
happy: there was nothing external by which he could account for a certain
blankness of sensibility which came over him just when his expectant gladness
should have been most lively, just when he exchanged the accustomed dullness
of his Lowick library for his visits to the Grange. Here was a weary experience
in which he was as utterly condemned to loneliness as in the despair which
sometimes threatened him while toiling in the morass of authorship without
seeming nearer to the goal. And his was that worst loneliness which would
shrink from sympathy. (Middlemarch, Chapter 10).

The author-narrator does not let her character entirely off the hook here, despite the protective
tenderness of that 'Poor Mr Casaubon'. For even as our view of Casaubon here is mediated
through the author's own sympathetic understanding of the man, it is often Casaubon's own
language that this passage adopts, only to turn it ironically against him. You may have noticed
that there is something disturbingly comic about this language with its mix of studiedly highflown poetic cliches (his picture for instance, of the 'matrimonial garden-scene' whose path is
to be 'bordered with flowers') and his usual formal precision (the 'compound interest of enjoyment' , for example, which he imagines owing to him as a result of his long bachelorhood).
Casaubon's inward ruminations on marriage have all the ring of 'a public statement' that his
very first speech in the novel is described as having in Chapter 2 of the novel, as well as all of
the detached, externalized sentiment which makes Casaubon's official debut as a lover - his
letter of proposal to Dorothea in Chapter 5 - so chilling. Yet this language is disturbing, I suggest, as well as faintly comic, not just because the subject matter here is personal need, feeling, human relations and love, but because this externalized mode is presented as constituting
- or substituting for - Casaubon's inner life. Usually when a novelist takes us into a character's thoughts and feelings and adopts the character's own language in the process, the effect
is one of emotional identification with the character even where - as often happens with
Dorothea in the early chapters - those thoughts and feelings are being in part judged as well
as described. Yet it is difficult to speak of emotional identification with a character whose distinguishing feature is presented to us here as lack of emotion, a lack which Casaubon himself
has not feeling enough to experience as a lack. Thus he looks elsewhere - to something 'exter-

16

nar - 'by which he could account for a certain blankness of sensibility which came over him
just when his expectant gladness should have been most lively'. It seems then as though those
outer estimates of Casaubon, stressing his aridity and sterility, - 'no better than a mummy', 'a
great bladder for dried peas to rattle in' - have not been so wrong. Yet the point of the narrator's commentary here in Chapter !O is to insist that those aspects of Casaubon which make
him all the less attractive as a husband for Dorothea - his incapacity for feeling (and sexual
impotence perhaps?) and his lack of inner life - make him feel all the more to be pitied as a
man. This explains why George Eliot as narrator feels compelled so often in the course of the
novel to speak on his behalf - to say for him, that is, what he cannot say for himself:
He was in danger of being saddened by the very conviction that his circumstances were unusually happy.... Here was a weary experience in which he
was utterly condemned to loneliness as in the despair which sometimes threatened him whilst toiling in the morass of authorship without seeming nearer to
the goal.
George Eliot intervenes at such times in the role of narrator to make up for her characters' deficiencies. People like Casaubon cannot or dare not detail their weaknesses even to themselves
let only to anyone else: 'He did not confess to himself, still less could he have breathed to
another, his surprise that though he had won a lovely and noble-hearted girl he had not won
delight.' George Eliot is conscientiously at such times, an add-on extra, because she provides
in her novel the back-up or voice, so often lacking in actual life, that speaks up for the failed
or inadequate life and saves it, if only at the level of verbal recognition, from being failure
merely.
In fact this task of articulating for her characters thoughts that they themselves cannot have or more often will not have - is one that is conscientiously undertaken by the author-narrator
across a whole range of character and situation. Two further and contrasting examples are provided by the following two passages. The first involves Mr Bulstrode, the successful banker
whose strict Evangelical principles are as uncompromising - and finally as self-serving - as
his business practices. The second relates to Mr Farebrother, the modest, unassuming clergyman whose whole life is a compromise in fact - a compromise between the duties and conduct
demanded by his profession, and the economic imperatives which drive him (as a poor clergyman, with a mother to support) to play cards for money, and a compromise between the
vocation - as natural scientist - he had wanted and the career he has been forced into following. Like so many characters in the novel, Farebrother lives in the shadow of the missed opportunity. As Lydgate says of him later in the novel, 'he ought to have done more than he has
done' . Lydgate, of course, could say the same about himself.

The following passage comes from Book 7 of the novel, which is entitled 'Two Temptations'.
The temptation besetting Bulstrode here is that of silencing once and for all the one person
who could irreparably damage his reputation by exposing his criminal past. Bulstrode is perhaps George Eliot's most Hardyesque figure - a man who finds himself involuntarily and ironically pursued and dogged by the past life which he hoped to have long left behind. (Consider
the protagonists of The Mayor of Casterbridge, or of Tess of the d' Urbervilles for analogous
examples.) Bulstrode is confronted with a visible memory of that past in the shape of Raffles,
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a fonner accomplice in his dubious business practices, who discovers Bulstrode's whereabouts
and begins to blackmail him. When Raffles falls ill, and Bulstrode finds himself in the position of nursing the sick man, with strict instructions from Lydgate as to his treatment, he sees
an opportunity to vanquish the past that has, so literal1y, caught up with him. It is the dead of
night now, and Bulstrode is keeping watch:
Whatever prayers he might lift up, whatever statements he might inwardly
make of this man's wretched spiritual condition, and the duty he himself was
under to submit to the punishment divinely appointed for him rather than to
wish for evil to another - through all this effort to condense words into a solid
mental state, there pierced and spread with irresistible vividness the images of
the events he desired. And in the train of those images came their apology. He
could not but see the death of Raffles, and see in it his own deliverance. What
was the removal of this wretched creature? He was impenitent - but were not
public criminals impenitent? - yet the law decided on their fate. Should
Providence in this case award death, there was no sin in contemplating death
as the desirable issue - if he kept his hands from hastening it - if he scrupulously did what was prescribed. Even here there might be a mistake; human
prescriptions were fallible things: Lydgate had said that treatment had hastened death, - why not his own method of treatment? But of course intention
was everything in the question of right and wrong.
And Bulstrode set himself to keep his intentions separate from his desire. He
inwardly declared that he intended to obey orders. Why should he have got
into any argument about the validity of these orders? It was only the common
trick of desire - which avails itself of any irrelevant scepticism, finding larger
room for itself in all uncertainty about effects, in every obscurity that looks
like the absence of law. (Middlemarch , Chapter 70)
At the opening of this first passage, the narrator recognizes how difficult it is for Bulstrode's
theoretic beliefs to withstand the temptation of desire. Indeed what makes those desires so
powerful is the fact that they are experienced not as thoughts or mere words or ideas, but as
something more primary - as images or perceptions: 'He could not but see in it his own deliverance'; 'through all his effort to condense words into a solid mental state, there spread with
irresistible vividness the images of the events he desired' . So far then, in that first sentence,
we have a man split in two - split that is between reason or duty, and desire. The trouble begins
for Bulstrode at that sentence - 'In the train of those images came their apology .. . '. As soon
as the desired end dictates the decision, so soon does Bulstrode have to banish the moral thinking part of himself, and even put reason distortedly in the service of the realization of desire:
'What was the removal of this wretched creature? .. Should Providence in this case award
death, there was no sin in contemplating death as the desirable issue.... Even here they might
be a mistake; human prescriptions were fallible things'. As soon as Bulstrode's reasoning faculty is thus used to justify his own wrong-doing he has effectively jettisoned, thrown out the
critical intelligence that would prevent such wrong-doing. True that critical intelligence keeps
coming back at him in this passage in those 'but' , 'yet' clauses, which show Bulstrode's continuing, if now rather feeble, struggle with his own conscience: 'Yet the law decided on [the]
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fate [of public criminals]; 'But of course intention was everything in the question of right and
wrong' . But Bulstrode cannot really admit those thoughts to himself - cannot commit himself
to them - and still go on with the action he contemplates. And it is these split-off thoughts
about himself - the reasoning and critical consciousness which he banishes - that George Eliot
stands in for here: 'Why should he have got into any argument about the validity of these
orders? It was only the common trick of desire - which avails itself of any irrelevant scepticism, finding larger room for itself in all uncertainty about effects, in every obscurity that
looks like the absence of law'. In that final sentence, the narrating voice asserts that Bulstrode
is using the apparent absence of any imperative - moral, medical or otherwise - to do one thing
or another, in order to do what he wants to do. Moreover, he is thereby evading, the implication is - since there only 'looks' to be an 'absence of law' - the law which does exist, within
Bulstrode, as that inward imperative against wrongdoing which for George Eliot was the
human, secularized equivalent of divine law. George Eliot is famously reported as having said,
in relation to the three concepts 'God, Immortality, Duty' , 'how inconceivable was the first,
how unbelievable the second, and yet how peremptory and absolute the third'. It is that
absolute law of 'duty' that Bulstrode is demonstrably eschewing here, and he himself is always
half conscious that that is what he is doing. Thus when George Eliot stands in as a reminder
of duty here, she is not so much explaining Bulstrode for him, or having thoughts which are
merely external to Bulstrode himself, as MacCabe suggests. Rather she is articulating thoughts
which originate in Bulstrode but which he himself is refusing to own or to embody. Indeed it
is because she believes so emphatically in the inward life as the higher law - higher, and more
absolute than any external authority could be - that she feels compelled to commit to language
the inward condition of people who refuse to do so for themselves.
Yet George Eliot also knew that there are men and women who cannot embody or own certain
truths about themselves and still be the men and women we would want them to be. So in the
case of Farebrother, of whom she says:
by dint of admitting to himself that he was too much as other men were, he had
become remarkably unlike them in this - that he could excuse others for thinking slightly of him, and could judge impartially of their conduct even when it
told against him. (Middlemarch, Chapter 18)
The modesty and self-effacing virtues which set Farebrother apart from other men depend
upon his not being able to see those virtues : ' by dint of admitting to himself that he was too
much as other men were, he had become remarkably unlike them in this .. . ' . To put it another
way, could Farebrother see that he was unlike other men - could he congratulate himself upon
being different - he wouldn't be unlike other men, nor offer the model of unassuming virtue
and quietly dogged duty which, in this novel, helps to correct and to redeem the evasive distortions of a Bulstrode.
George Eliot, I have been arguing through these examples, is there as a presence within her
novel, to see and articulate what her characters, for better or for worse, cannot see or say for
themselves. It is as if language, as used by the narrator, is there in place of, or perhaps more
truly, in memory of what God used to be - seeing within or about a person what is invisible to
everybody else and sometimes invisible even to the person himself or herself. But I do not
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mean by saying this that George Eliot is trying presumptuously to ape a God-like authority and
wisdom, setting herself up as a quasi-divine figure, as she is often accused of doing. Rather it
is as if she exists as a voice within her novel, in part at least, as a secular equivalent of a God'seye view, whose business in the novel is that which used to belong to God - judging, forgiving, extenuating, or affirming those actions for which there may well be no visible reward or
recognition in merely human terms. And, as has often been recognized by readers and critics
of George Eliot, there is a very real sense in which she conscientiously sought to offer her novelistic vision and voice as a secular replacement for God.
George Eliot lost her faith in a Christian God at an early age, yet she never lost her need for
something like a religious faith - for belief in something which could unite human beings in
the way Christianity had once done. One of the earliest achievements of her writing career,
before she became a novelist and while she was still Marian Evans, was her translation of
Ludwig Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity. Feuerbach argued that the virtuous qualities
of love, charity, mercy, pity which humans had projected onto God were qualities and needs
which belonged to humans themselves. Religion, said Feuerbach, arose as the result of an
urgent, imaginative need in humankind to objectify - in the form of a perfect, transcendental
being - the very best qualities, the highest yearnings and feelings of humanity itself. As
George Eliot put it in a letter of 1874: 'The idea of God, so far as it has been a high spiritual
influence, is the ideal of a goodness entirely human (i.e. an exaltation of the human)' . What
was needful now, as Feuerbach saw it, was for humans to recognize that the qualities and
strengths they had found in God, were really their own. That way, the human content of
Christianity could be retained even while its form was rejected.
With Feuerbach, Marian Evans wrote, 'I everywhere agree' . For in Feuerbach she had found
a philosophical basis for preserving, in the form of humanist morality, what she valued in
Christian theology. Indeed it has often been remarked that the voice and language that we call
'George Eliot', most especially in Middlemarch, can be viewed as a creation of Marian
Evans's Feuerbachian principles. For George Eliot, as narrator, stands as witness to and in
memory of those virtues and values which the author feared were being lost with the loss of
formal Christianity, even as that form was humanly created. It is as if she exists in her novels
to provide the humane language which can bear witness to and hold onto the spirit of those
Christian values - love, pity, mercy, charity (and their corresponding judgement), as though
she were seeking to do through her novels what prayer and church-going had once done for
Christian believers. I shall come back to this important point at the close of this lecture.
One problem, however, emerges from this emphasis upon George Eliot's narrative voice as a
secular replacement for God. For it can begin to look as though George Eliot exists within her
novels as a merely secondary form of consolation or reassurance - a sort of urgently improvised stop-gap for an absent divinity, standing in for the real thing. Yet what I want to argue in
the final part of this lecture is that, on the contrary, the author's voice and language is speaking on behalf not of something that isn't there, but of something that is there, yet which often
goes unnoticed or unacknowledged in ordinary life. In doing so, moreover, the revelations of
the narrator, I want to argue, are anything but reassuring - rather, the opposite. For what the
narrator's presence so often exposes, tactfully and very often regretfully, is that the deepest and
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most common failure among the inhabitants of Middlemarch is not after all perhaps in vocation, or in the loss of ideals, but in their inability fully to understand or communicate with one
another. Middlemarch is presented as a community, paradoxically, of essentially separate people. And it is that fundamental separateness or loneliness of her characters, I shall argue, that
calls into being the narrative voice.
This is particularly true in relation to those most central and most moving chapters of the novel
- those that deal with the unhappy marriage relationships of Dorothea and Casaubon and of
Lydgate and Rosamond. As an initial example of the sort of thing I have in mind we can go
back to the dialogue between Lydgate and Rosamond with which I began, where, I hope it can
be agreed, the narrator is not above her characters so much as moving to and fro between them.
This passage comes later in the same scene, where Lydgate is telling Rosamond that an inventory of their possessions will be begun the following day:
'Remember it is a mere security: it will m~e no difference: it is a temporary
affair. I insist upon it that your father shall not know unless I choose to tell
him,' added Lydgate, with a more peremptory emphasis.
This certainly was unkind, but Rosamond had thrown him back on evil expectation as to what she would do in the way of quiet steady disobedience.
(Middlemarch, Chapter 58)
Judgement of Lydgate, which again, we feel, is his own judgement of himself as much as it is
the narrator's ('This certainly was unkind') is here balanced by psychological explanation
('Rosarnond had thrown him back on evil expectation ... '). The paragraph then shifts to register the effects now of Lydgate's words on Rosamond.
The unkindness seemed unpardonable to her: she was not given to weeping
and disliked it, but now her chin and lips began to tremble and the tears welled
up. (ibid.)
Rosamond, without the benefit of the narrator's access to psychological motivation, cannot
forgive Lydgate's words as the narrator can: 'The unkindness seemed unpardonable to her'.
And if this is in part a failure of imaginative sympathy on Rosamond's part, it is a failure that
Lydgate also in part shares. The paragraph goes on:
Perhaps it was not possible for Lydgate, under the double stress of outward
material difficulty and of his own proud resistance to humiliating consequences, to imagine fully what his sudden trial was to a young creature who
had known nothing but indulgence, and whose dreams had all been of new
indulgence, more exactly to her taste. (ibid.)
The paragraph, like the larger scene and chapter of which it is a small representative part, shifts
continually from one to the other of this couple to reveal that Lydgate, like Rosamond herself
(if more excusably given the myriad pressures besetting him) is feeling too much on his own
account to 'imagine fully' what Rosamond is feeling on hers. What the narrator's 'background
of understanding' (as I called it earlier) is revealing here is that the critical event in this scene
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is really a non-event, something that doesn't happen. For it is the absence of any sharing of
their suffering that is mutually damaging to themselves and to their relationship. That absence,
by definition, is not tangible; it is not realizable by the characters themselves, so immersed as
they are in their thoughts and feelings; but neither, paradoxically, is it not there, for it exists as
the fundamental failure of their relationship. Compare the narrator's disclosures of what
remains unspoken and unseen between Dorothea and Casaubon in what is perhaps the most
moving chapter of their relationship, Chapter 42. After Casaubon has learned from Lydgate
that he is dying, Dorothea goes to join him in the garden. 'She might have represented, ' we are
told, 'a heaven-sent angel coming with a promise that the short hours remaining should yet be
filled with that faithful love that clings the closer to a comprehended grief' :
His glance in reply to hers was so chill that she felt her timidity increased; yet
she turned and passed her hand through his arm.
Mr Casaubon kept his hands behind him and allowed her pliant arm to cling
with difficulty against his rigid arm.
There was something horrible to Dorothea in the sensation which this unresponsive hardness inflicted on her. That is a strong word, but not too strong: it
is in these acts called trivialities that the seeds of joy are for ever wasted, until
men and women look round with haggard faces at the devastation their own
waste has made, and say, the earth bears no harvest of sweetness - calling their
denial knowledge. You may ask why, in the name of manliness, Mr Casaubon
should have behaved in that way. Consider that his was a mind which shrank
from pity: have you ever watched in such a mind the effect of a suspicion that
what is pressing it as a grief may really be a source of contentment, either actual or future, to the being who already offends by pitying? Besides, he knew little of Dorothea's sensations, and had not reflected that on such an occasion as
the present they were comparable in strength to his own sensibilities.
(Middlemarch , Chapter 42)
Again we see two people, together in marriage, yet experiencing the unhappiness and mutual
failure of their relationship alone. And again we find the background of understanding supplied
by the narrator here helping to explain and excuse how these two are inadvertently hurting one
another out of the equivalent sense of hurt they are suffering within themselves. 'Besides, he
knew little of Dorothea's sensations, and had not reflected that on such occasion as the present
they were comparable in strength to his own sensibilities.' Yet the pity of it is, of course, that
neither Dorothea nor Casaubon can cross the boundary of being which separates them as the
narrator can. They cannot know or experience the deep inside of the other partner and at the
same time authentically suffer what is going on within themselves. The very paragraph division
at the opening of the passage - a Dorothea paragraph, and then a Casaubon paragraph - seems
to underscore their separateness from one another. 'Poor Lydgate!' the narrator exclaims early
in the novel, 'or shall I say Poor Rosamond! Each lived in a world of which the other knew
nothing.' The same applies emphatically to Dorothea and Casaubon in Chapter 42. And once
we find this same ' total missing of one another's mental track', as the narrator describes it at
one point, repeated from one relationship to another, then the problem seems to be less the result
of any particular relationship and more like a problem of marriage in general. Indeed the prob-
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lem now seems generically related to 'the difficult task of knowing another soul' which is a
major concern of the novel as a whole, and to which the narrator's background of understanding continually bears witness. Take this moment, for instance, from earlier in Chapter 42 where
Casaubon has asked Lydgate to enlighten him as to the real state of his health:
To a mind largely instructed in the human destiny hardly anything could be
more interesting than the inward conflict implied in [Casaubon'sl formal measured address, delivered with the usual sing-song and motion of the head. Nay,
are there many situations more sublimely tragic than the struggle of the soul
with the demand to renounce a work which has been all the significance of its
life - a significance which is to vanish as the waters which come and go where
no man has need of them? But there was nothing to strike others as sublime
about Mr Casaubon, and Lydgate, who had some contempt at hand for futile
scholarship, felt a little amusement mingling with his pity. He was at present
too ill-acquainted with disaster to enter into the pathos of a lot where everything is below the level of tragedy except the passionate egoism of the sufferer. (Middlemarch, Chapter 42)
The paragraph shifts seamlessly from the depths of Casaubon's tragically painful sense of his
own significance to the shallows of Lydgate's response, in ruefully ironic disclosure of the fact
that these separated worlds have no consciousness of one another and that what is all-in-all to
one simply cannot matter equivalently to the other: 'But there was nothing to strike others as
sublime about Mr Casaubon ... '; 'He was at present too ill-acquainted with disaster ... '.
It looks to be the case, then, that the failures in contact and communication between marriage

partners in the novel is only a more intense form ofthat difficulty of ever getting beyond one's
own point of view which affects virtually every relationship in the novel. Certainly the cumulative message of the narrator's background of understanding at such times is that this problem is deeply nobody's fault: rather it is a generic human fault or limitation which everyone,
to a greater or lesser extent, shares in common - simply a part of what it is to be human. Yet
it can probably be agreed that the problem is presented as a more profoundly testing and even
tragic one within the context of the marriages in the novel. And no wonder, perhaps. For the
very idea of marriage is predicated on the ideal of union. Marriage, that is to say, holds out the
promise of overcoming the isolation of the separated ego: it is where, if anywhere perhaps, one
plus one can become two together. Yet in the two central marriage relationships of the novel,
couples are brought together only to exist unfulfillingly apart. That is why the background of
understanding supplied by the narrator is anything but reassuring. For in obeying the formal
requirements of dialogue, moving to and fro between two people, giving equal weight to both
sides, the author-narrator repeatedly reveals how little Dorothea and Casaubon, Rosamond and
Lydgate, ever can understand, help or share with one another. This sub-text reveals moreover
that even the effort of understanding and pity which does finally go out from Dorothea to
Casaubon - 'yet she turned and passed her hand through his arm' - remains entirely and uselessly separate from him:
Mr Casaubon kept his hands behind him and allowed her pliant arm to cling
with difficulty against his rigid arm.
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It is as if marriage in this novel is the place or condition in which these people discover the
essential, perhaps final loneliness of separated consciousness. And that sense of loneliness is
only increased in this novel by the fact that whilst the characters of Lydgate and Dorothea suffer equally from their marriages and share broadly the same trouble in common, they can do
so little to help one another. 'Advise me. Think what I can do' is Dorothea's moving appeal to
Lydgate in Chapter 30 when the latter has infornied her of her husband's state of health. 'He
has been labouring all his life':
For years after Lydgate remembered the impression produced in him by this
involuntary appeal - this cry from soul to soul, without other consciousness
than their moving with kindred natures in the same embroiled medium, the
same troublous fitfully-illuminated life. (Chapter 30)
'But,' the narrator goes on what could he say now except that he should see Mr Casaubon tomorrow?
(ibid.)
'Think what I can do'; 'what could he say?; 'what can I doT Those four words and their variations occur and recur repeatedly throughout the novel, not just within the context of marriage
relationships but across a whole range of character and situation. As Barbara Hardy has pointed out, the same urgent questioning scattered throughout the novel and from character to character suggests, quite as much as the fully realized provincial setting, a community of characters 'moving in the same embroiled medium, the same troublous, fitfully illuminated life'. Yet
even as the members of this community are shown struggling with the same problems - in
marriage, in vocation, in fear and in failure - they are also shown as unable, literally or openly, to share the suffering which they do share in a more hidden or tacit sense.
Yet precisely because her characters can very often do nothing in the way of help or alleviation, George Eliot feels compelled to do something. Indeed it is the very failures of communication between her characters which seem to bring George Eliot as a voice, a language, an
articulating presence, into being. Of Casaubon's rejection of Dorothea's tenderness in Chapter
42, the narrator says: 'it is these acts called trivialities that the seeds of joy are forever wasted'. George Eliot's need to give off abstract thoughts at such times seems to stem from a sense
of humane responsibility she feels to save these two creatures from final loneliness, if only by
making her readers recognize that loneliness and sympathetically share in each separated
instance of it. 'There was something horrible to Dorothea in the sensation .. .. That is a strong
word but not too strong'; 'Consider that his was a mind which shrank from pity . . .'. George
Eliot, as narrator, is here occupying the gap in understanding which exists between Dorothea
and Casaubon, just as much later, she will unfold into explicitness the hidden, incommunicable yet incalculably profound effect of Dorothea's simple act of trust in Lydgate's honour when
he is implicated in Raffles's death:
Lydgate turned, remembering where he was, and saw Dorothea's face looking
up at him with a sweet trustful gravity. The presence of a noble nature, generous in its wishes, ardent in its charity, changes the lights for us: we begin to
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see things again in their larger, quieter masses, and to believe that we too can
be seen and judged in the wholeness of our character. (Middlemarch , Chapter 76)
George Eliot, as narrator, is herself a 'presence' here, summoned as she characteristically is by
what remains unexpressed inside or between people. It is as if 'George Eliot' exists within her
novels in order to give tangible reality and articulate presence to feelings and thoughts which
often cannot be acknowledged by humans themselves, yet which call for articulation in others
if their human meaning is not to be wasted, lost or forgotten amidst life's ordinary density.
Yet you might well object that all this verbal recognition does no real, practical good, after all.
These people remain stuck in bad marriages or in failure, never sharing that failure at the level
of speech or of direct alleviation. George Eliot even knows how useless is her own intervention so far as her own creatures are concerned. The very sympathy she extends to Casaubon
involves the tough recognition that he would rebuff her pity exactly as he had shunned
Dorothea's own. ' His was that worst loneliness that would shrink from sympathy.' Yet George
Eliot seems to see her first responsibility to the community that exists outside rather than
inside the novel - the community of readers who, it is likely, are suffering in loneliness and
failure quite as much as their counterparts inside the novel. But George Eliot gives to these
real creatures what their fictional counterparts do not have - an image of that failure and loneliness which is also redeemed, through the operation of the narrative voice, from silence and
waste. But she also speaks to make the loneliness and suffering which is not shared in the
novel, really shared with her reader. If we, as readers, are enabled to recognize that the troubles we suffer alone, we also share in common, we might also begin to share in what George
Eliot's voice offers and represents - a mode of feeling and sensibility which keeps alive the
chance of genuine human community, even in the loss of the formal Christianity which might
once have guaranteed it. To say, then, that George Eliot exists in her novels for her reader's
sake is really to say that she exists in her novels for humanity's sake - to keep the possibility
of real community open. And in the absence of a God, we could do worse than a George Eliot.
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